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HOLDING BACK THE (CRIMSON) TIDE OF 
TRADEMARK LITIGATION: THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT SHIELDS WORKS OF ART FROM 
LANHAM ACT CLAIMS IN NEW LIFE ART 
Abstract: On June 11, 2012, in University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. 
New Life Art, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the Lanham Act does not apply to works of art that include others’ 
trademarks as long as the use of the trademark is artistically relevant to 
the underlying work and does not explicitly mislead consumers into be-
lieving that the trademark holder endorsed or sponsored its use. In so 
holding, the Eleventh Circuit provided clarity to artists as to what types of 
trademark uses are permitted in their works. This Comment argues that 
the Eleventh Circuit’s standard is beneficial to artists and should be 
adopted by other courts. 
Introduction 
 In 2005, the University of Alabama brought suit against Daniel A. 
Moore, an artist whose paintings capture scenes of the university’s foot-
ball team.1 The school alleged that Moore’s works—which feature real-
istic portrayals of the university’s uniforms, helmets, and jerseys—
violated the Lanham Act.2 The Lanham Act protects trademark holders 
from unauthorized uses of their marks that may cause confusion 
among consumers as to the trademark holder’s involvement in the 
mark’s use.3 In 2012, in University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life 
Art, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 
Moore’s use of the university’s trademarks in his paintings, prints, and 
calendars was protected under the First Amendment.4 As such, Moore’s 
                                                                                                                      
1 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1269–70 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
2 Id.; see Randall L. Newsom, Note, Cease and Desist: Finding an Equitable Solution in Trade-
mark Disputes Between High Schools and Colleges, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1833, 1849 (2011) (“[T]he ex-
pansive nature of the Lanham Act and the increased revenues from collegiate merchandise 
have led collegiate institutions to step up their pursuit of trademark infringers . . . .”). 
3 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2006). The Lanham Act, in relevant part, prohibits 
the “use[ ] in commerce” of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device” which “is likely to 
cause confusion . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the trademark owner’s] 
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . . .” Id. 
4 New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1282. 
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use of the university’s marks was not subject to Lanham Act scrutiny.5 
Thus, in this battle between trademark protection under the Lanham 
Act and artistic expression protection under the First Amendment, ar-
tistic expression won.6 
 In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the balanc-
ing test articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in 1989 in Rogers v. Grimaldi.7 In Rogers, the Second Circuit held that 
because of First Amendment concerns, the Lanham Act should only 
apply to works of artistic expression when “the public interest in avoid-
ing consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expres-
sion.”8 To balance these interests, the Rogers court discussed two factors, 
which would be used by subsequent courts as a two-prong test.9 Under 
the two-prong test, the public interest in protecting artistic expression 
outweighs the public interest in avoiding confusion unless (1) the 
trademark use is not artistically relevant to the underlying work, or (2) 
the work “explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work.”10 
 By invoking the Rogers test in its New Life Art decision, the Eleventh 
Circuit became the fourth circuit to apply the Rogers balancing test for 
Lanham Act cases involving trademarks used within works of art.11 But, 
despite their common invocation of the balancing test articulated in 
Rogers, the circuits’ approaches to that test have varied.12 Specifically, 
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. at 1278. 
6 See id. at 1276–77, 1278–79. 
7 Id. at 1278; see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
8 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
9 See New Life Art, 684 F.3d at 1278; ESS Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 
F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
10 New Life Art, 684 F.3d at 1278 (quoting ESS Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099). 
11 See id. at 1278 (recognizing that other circuits have adopted this standard); ESS 
Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099 (applying the Rogers test to the use of an entertainment club’s 
likeness in a video game); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936–37 (6th Cir. 
2003) (applying the Rogers test to the use of a celebrity’s likeness in a work of art); Cliffs 
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495(2d Cir. 1989) 
(applying the Rogers test to the use of a book’s trademarked cover design in creating a par-
ody); see also Thomas M. Byron, Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s View of 
the “Explicitly Misleading” Prong of the Rogers Test, 19 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 8 (2011) (stating, 
prior to the New Life Art decision, that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, 
and Ninth Circuits have applied the Rogers test to trademark uses found within works of 
art). 
12 Compare New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1278–79 (adopting the overall balancing standard 
and two-prong test as articulated in Rogers), and ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936–37 (same), with 
ESS Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099–1100 (adopting the Rogers overall balancing test and two-
prong test but using a likelihood of confusion analysis to measure whether a trademark use 
is “explicitly misleading”), and Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 (adopting the Rogers balancing 
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the circuits have differed in their approaches to the two prongs of the 
test: first, in how to balance the competing interests of avoiding con-
sumer confusion and protecting artistic expression, and second, in how 
to define “explicitly misleading.”13 
 This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the 
Rogers test in New Life Art should be adopted by other courts.14 Part I 
outlines the facts and procedural history of New Life Art.15 Part II dis-
cusses Rogers and how different circuits have applied its balancing test.16 
Finally, Part III argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the 
Rogers test in New Life Art encourages artistic expression by allowing art-
ists to use others’ trademarks in their works.17 It further argues that the 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach in New Life Art provides clarity to artists, 
trademark holders, and courts as to which types of trademark uses are 
protected and which are not.18 
I. The Eleventh Circuit Application of the Rogers Two-Prong 
Test to Works of Artistic Expression in New Life Art 
 Since 1979, Daniel A. Moore has painted historical scenes of the 
University of Alabama football team.19 The paintings—which he has 
produced and sold as prints, calendars, mugs, and other articles—
feature realistic portrayals of the university’s uniforms, including its 
crimson and white helmets and jerseys.20 Although Moore entered into 
a series of agreements with the university to produce and market speci-
fied items that featured Alabama’s trademarks, Moore also produced 
and sold other Alabama-related paintings that were not the subjects of 
any licensing agreements.21 
 In 2002, the university told Moore that he needed the university’s 
permission to use its trademarks in his works.22 In particular, the univer-
sity claimed that Moore needed its authorization to portray its crimson 
                                                                                                                      
standard without utilizing the two-prong Rogers test to evaluate if the public interest in 
avoiding confusion outweighed the public interest in artistic expression in this case). 
13 See Byron, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
14 See infra notes 82–93 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 19–39 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 40–81 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 82–93 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 82–93 and accompanying text. 
19 New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1269. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1269–70. 
22 Id. at 1270. 
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and white uniforms and helmets.23 Moore responded that he did not 
need the university’s consent to paint scenes from Alabama football 
games and that his works did not constitute trademark violations be-
cause his uses of the university’s marks were confined to the scenes he 
captured, rather than extending to the frame or packaging of the paint-
ings.24 
 In 2005, unable to reach a resolution, the university filed suit 
against Moore in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama.25 The complaint alleged that Moore’s paintings and prints, 
among other items, violated the Lanham Act by infringing the universi-
ty’s trademark rights in its football uniforms.26 The university argued 
that Moore’s use of Alabama’s football uniforms in his works created a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of buyers as to the university’s in-
volvement with these products.27 In response, Moore argued that the 
First Amendment protected his use of the university’s uniforms in his 
works.28 
 In November 2009, in New Life Art, the Northern District of Ala-
bama reviewed the facts relating to Moore’s works and made two find-
ings.29 First, the court found that the university’s uniform colors may be 
a weak trade dress mark.30 Second, the court found that Moore’s paint-
ings may create a likelihood of confusion as to the school’s involvement 
with Moore’s works.31 Nonetheless, the district court granted summary 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1270. 
26 Id.; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose and terms of the 
Lanham Act). Other items to which the university objected included calendars, mugs, and 
other mundane items. New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1270–71. The university also alleged that 
Moore had breached several terms of his prior licensing agreements with Alabama. Id. at 
1270. 
27 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249 (N.D. Ala. 
2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 684 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012). 
28 See id. at 1250. 
29 Id. at 1258–59. 
30 Id. at 1247, 1258. Trade dress is a term used to describe the packaging of a product 
or a product’s design. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that trade dress constitutes a “symbol” or “device” 
under the Lanham Act. Id. 
31 New Life Art, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1259. To measure the likelihood of consumer confu-
sion, the district court looked at seven factors: (1) the type of mark used by the university; 
(2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the similarity of the goods or services represented by 
the marks; (4) the similarity of the retail outlets and the customers served; (5) the similari-
ty of the advertising media used by the parties; (6) whether Moore had the intent to in-
fringe; and (7) any evidence of actual confusion. Id. at 1249–50 (citing Frehling Enters., 
Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Lisa P. Ramsey, 
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judgment to Moore with respect to his paintings and prints, concluding 
that they were protected works of expression under the First Amend-
ment.32 The university appealed.33 
 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling 
that the Lanham Act did not apply to Moore’s use of the university’s 
trademarks in paintings and prints.34 Although the Eleventh Circuit 
largely agreed with the district court’s findings regarding the strength 
of the university’s marks and the likelihood of consumer confusion re-
sulting from Moore’s works, the court determined that these evalua-
tions were unnecessary.35 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the 
balancing test set forth by the Second Circuit in 1989  in Rogers.36 The 
Eleventh Circuit held that when dealing with trademark uses in works 
of art, courts must balance the competing public interests of protecting 
artistic expression and avoiding consumer confusion.37 The court then 
held that under this balancing test, a trademark use is permitted as 
long as the mark’s use has some artistic relevance to the underlying 
work and does not explicitly mislead consumers as to the source or con-
tent of the work.38 Applying this standard, the court ruled that Moore’s 
paintings, prints, and calendars were subject to First Amendment pro-
tection because: (1) the trademark uses were artistically relevant to 
Moore’s underlying works, and (2) Moore never promoted his works as 
“endorsed” or “sponsored” by the university.39 
                                                                                                                      
Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 
BUFF. L. REV. 851, 894–95 (2010) (discussing eight factors, among others, that courts use 
when conducting a likelihood of confusion analysis, including the likelihood of expansion 
of product lines and the seven used by the district court in New Life Art). 
32 New Life Art, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1259. The district court held that Moore’s works 
were also shielded from Lanham Act claims based on artistic expression and fair use de-
fenses. Id. Conversely, the district court held in the university’s favor with respect to 
Moore’s portrayal of Alabama’s uniforms on mugs, calendars, and other products. Id. at 
1243. The court reasoned that these articles are distinct from fine art and therefore are 
not entitled to the same First Amendment protection. Id. at 1241. 
33 New Life Art, 684 F.3d at 1271. Moore appealed the court’s determination that his 
use of Alabama’s trademarks on mugs, calendars, and other products was not protected by 
the First Amendment. Id. 
34 Id. at 1276. Additionally, unlike the district court, the Eleventh Circuit determined 
that the calendars Moore produced also were subject to First Amendment protection. Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 1278; see Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999; see also notes 45–60 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Rogers balancing test). 
37 New Life Art, 684 F.3d at 1278; see Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
38 New Life Art, 684 F.3d at 1278 (quoting ESS Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099). 
39 Id. at 1278–79. In its ruling, the Eleventh Circuit also reversed the district court’s 
decision regarding the licensing agreements’ coverage of the “mundane products” —most 
notably, mugs—because disputed issues of fact remained. Id. at 1282. The Eleventh Circuit 
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II. Differing Approaches to the Rogers Balancing Test 
 In its 2012 decision in New Life Art, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit became the fourth circuit to invoke the balancing 
test first articulated in 1989 in Rogers v. Grimaldi by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.40 But the circuits that have invoked the 
Rogers balancing test have applied it differently.41 Section A of this Part 
discusses the balancing test as it was articulated by the Rogers court.42 
Section B discusses how the various circuits have applied that test.43 
A. The Rogers Balancing Test 
 In Rogers, the Second Circuit addressed whether the Lanham Act 
applied to titles of works of art.44 In that case, Ginger Rogers, an enter-
tainer known for performing with Fred Astaire, sued the producers and 
distributors of a film entitled “Ginger and Fred,” claiming that their use 
of her celebrity name violated the Lanham Act.45 The defendants coun-
tered that the First Amendment protected their use of the title.46 On 
reviewing the case, the Second Circuit reasoned that although First 
Amendment concerns do not insulate titles of works from all Lanham 
Act claims, the Act should be construed narrowly to avoid intruding on 
First Amendment values.47 To that end, the Second Circuit established 
a balancing test to determine when the Lanham Act applies.48 
                                                                                                                      
did not address Moore’s First Amendment arguments relating to his use of trademarks on 
mundane products because he waived the ability to argue this point at the district court 
level. Id. at 1280. The district court had concluded that calendars, mugs, and other mun-
dane products were not subject to Lanham Act protection because they were “impulse 
buys” and thus different from “fine art.” New Life Art, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. The Elev-
enth Circuit did not explain why it disagreed with the district court’s determination that 
Moore’s calendars were not subject to Lanham Act protection. New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 
1276. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Moore’s unli-
censed paintings and prints were not prohibited by the licensing agreements, thus making 
the First Amendment issues regarding unauthorized use of the trademarks relevant. Id. at 
1282. 
40 See Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 
2012); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); Byron, supra note 11, at 8. 
41 See infra notes 59–81 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 59–81 and accompanying text. 
44 See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
45 Id. at 996–97. Rogers claimed that the title would lead others to believe that the film 
was about her or that she had sanctioned it. Id. at 997. 
46 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
47 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998. The court reasoned that “[t]itles, like the artistic works they 
identify, are of a hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and commercial promotion.” 
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 Under the Rogers balancing test, the Lanham Act applies to works of 
art only in circumstances in which the public interest in avoiding con-
sumer confusion outweighs the public interest in protecting artistic ex-
pression.49 The court then discussed two factors to evaluate whether this 
balancing tipped in favor of applying the Lanham Act in a particular 
case.50 The court indicated that the Lanham Act should not be applied 
to a work unless (1) “the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying 
work whatsoever” or (2) “the title explicitly misleads as to the source or 
the content of the work.”51 The court stated that the “artistic relevance” 
threshold was “low” and only required the title to have something to do 
with the work for the title to be exempt from Lanham Act scrutiny.52 As 
for the “explicitly misleading” prong, the court indicated that titles such 
as Nimmer on Copyright and Jane Fonda’s Workout Book would not shield the 
art from Lanham Act scrutiny if Nimmer and Fonda had nothing to do 
with those works.53 The court reasoned that if a person’s name or a 
trademark were used in this explicit way and the use had nothing to do 
with the work, then the Lanham Act would apply because confusion 
concerns would outweigh artistic expression concerns.54 
 Applying this standard, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
Lanham Act did not apply to the defendants’ film title.55 First, the title 
of the film was artistically relevant because the main characters in the 
film were named Ginger and Fred.56 Second, the title did not explicitly 
indicate that Rogers endorsed the film.57 Despite some survey evidence 
suggesting consumer confusion, the court concluded that this risk of 
misunderstanding was so outweighed by the public interest in artistic 
expression that the Lanham Act did not apply, and thus the film’s use 
of the name “Ginger” could stand.58 
                                                                                                                      
Id. Because of this hybrid nature, the court concluded that consumers have a duel interest 
in (1) not being misled and (2) enjoying an author’s work. Id. 
48 Id. at 999. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 999; Alexandra E. Olson, Note, Dilution by Tarnishment: An Unworkable Cause 
of Action in Cases of Artistic Expression, 53 B.C. L. REV. 693, 710–11 (2012) (“The Artistic Rel-
evance Test operates under the rationale that artistic expression is a form of speech owed 
special protection under the First Amendment, but not absolute immunity.” (citing Rogers, 
875 F.2d at 999)). 
52 See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1001. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. 
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B. The Circuits Apply the Rogers Test Differently 
 Since the Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers, the Second, Sixth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted three different approaches 
to the Rogers balancing test.59 The first approach, which uses the overall 
balancing test and the two-prong analysis found in Rogers, faithfully cor-
responds to the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Rogers.60 Under this 
standard, a trademark use is protected as long as it is artistically relevant 
to the underlying work and does not explicitly mislead regarding the 
source of the work.61 Both the Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit 
(in New Life Art) have adopted this approach.62 In 2003, in ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Publishing, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit be-
came the first circuit to adopt this approach.63 Golfer Tiger Woods sued 
an artist for using his image in a painting of Masters Tournament win-
ners, alleging Lanham Act violations.64 Utilizing the two-prong test ar-
ticulated in Rogers, the court determined that the use of Woods’s image 
in the painting was entitled to First Amendment protection.65 The 
court reasoned that Woods’s image was artistically relevant to the un-
derlying work and that the artist did not explicitly mislead consumers 
to believe that Woods was involved in its production.66 The court then 
applied these determinations to the overall Rogers balancing test.67 It 
concluded that the artistic expression interests so outweighed the risk 
of consumer confusion in this case that the Lanham Act did not ap-
ply.68 
 The second approach uses the overall balancing test and the two-
prong analysis found in Rogers, but when determining whether a 
                                                                                                                      
59 See infra notes 60– 81 and accompanying text. 
60 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936–37 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying 
this standard to the use of a celebrity’s likeness in a work of art); Byron, supra note 11, at 
10–11 (citing ETW Corp. as a case that adopts this approach to the Rogers test). 
61 See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937; Byron, supra note 11, at 10–11. 
62 See New Life Art, 684 F.3d at 1278–79; ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936–37; see also supra 
notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s application of the 
Rogers overall balancing test and two-pronged analysis in New Life Art). 
63 See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936–37; Byron, supra note 11, at 10–11. 
64 ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 918–19. Woods’s Lanham Act claims included trademark in-
fringement, dilution of the mark, unfair competition, and false advertising. Id. at 919. 
65 Id. at 936–37. 
66 Id. at 936–37; Byron, supra note 11, at 11. 
67 ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937. 
68 Id. But see id. at 945 (Clay, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority should not have 
declared that the artist’s inclusion of Woods’s image in the painting was artistically relevant 
and not explicitly misleading without more meaningfully considering evidence from a 
survey of consumers about their beliefs of Woods’s involvement in the work, as required, 
according to the dissent, under the Rogers test). 
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trademark use is explicitly misleading, this approach uses a likelihood 
of confusion analysis.69 Thus, this approach differs from other applica-
tions of the “explicitly misleading” prong because instead of evaluating 
whether the artist conveyed that the trademark holder was involved in 
the work, this approach measures whether consumers would be confused as 
to the trademark holder’s involvement in the work.70 In 2008, in ESS 
Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit adopted this standard.71 The defendant’s 
video game, “Grand Theft Auto,” featured a fictionalized version of the 
plaintiff’s Los Angeles strip club.72 After determining that the use of 
the strip club’s image was artistically relevant to the game, the court 
turned its attention to the “explicitly misleading” prong.73 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the proper inquiry regarding this prong was 
whether game players would be confused into thinking that the strip 
club was somehow affiliated with the video game.74 The court then 
concluded that “reasonable consumer[s]” would not be confused as to 
the source of the trademark’s use because they would not believe that 
the strip club produced the video game or contributed its expertise in 
the defendant’s design of it.75 
 The third approach adopts the overall balancing test but does not 
use the two-prong test found in Rogers.76 Instead of asking whether the 
use of the trademark is artistically relevant to the underlying work or 
explicitly misleads consumers as to the trademark holder’s involvement 
                                                                                                                      
69 Byron, supra note 11, at 15 (citing ESS Entertainment as a case that adopts this ap-
proach to the Rogers test); see ESS Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 
1095, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying this standard to the use of a strip club’s likeness 
in a video game). 
70 See ESS Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099–1100; see also New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1278–79 (eval-
uating whether an artist marketed the work as being endorsed by or affiliated with the 
trademark holder); ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937 (stating that the “risk of consumer misun-
derstanding not engendered by any explicit indication on [its] face” satisfies the explicitly 
misleading prong). 
71 See ESS Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1099–1100; Byron, supra note 11, at 15. 
72 ESS Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1097. 
73 Id. at 1100. The court determined that the use of the club’s image was “relevant” in 
recreating the “cartoon-style” parody of East Los Angeles that the producers sought. Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1100–01. The court reached this determination based on its conclusion that 
the strip club and the video game have “nothing in common.” Id. at 1100. The court rea-
soned that the strip club and the game “do not go together,” consumers would not reason-
ably believe that Rockstar maintained a strip club or that ESS created the video game, and 
someone playing the video game would not think that ESS provided any expertise to 
Rockstar in the production of the game. Id. 
76 See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 
(2d Cir. 1989); Byron, supra note 11, at 12–13. 
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with the work, this approach utilizes a more free-form likelihood of 
confusion analysis to balance the public’s competing interests in pro-
tecting artistic expression and avoiding confusion.77 In 1989, four 
months after it decided Rogers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Se-
cond Circuit adopted this approach in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Double-
day Dell Publishing Group.78 Cliffs Notes alleged that Bantam violated the 
Lanham Act by publishing a parody of a Cliffs Notes study guide featur-
ing a black and yellow cover that replicated Cliffs Notes’s trademarked 
design.79 Using a likelihood of confusion analysis, the court determined 
that the defendant’s parody cover raised only a slight risk of consumer 
confusion, a concern the court held did not outweigh artistic expres-
sion concerns.80 In reaching its conclusion, the court cited factors such 
as the nature of the work (a parody), the design of the work’s cover, the 
sophistication of Cliffs Notes readers, and the prominence of the word 
“satire” on the parody’s cover.81 
III. New Life Art Provides Clarity to Artists Regarding the 
Scope of Acceptable Trademark Uses in Their Works 
 In adopting its own version of the Rogers balancing test, the Elev-
enth Circuit in New Life Art used clear, comprehendible terms to de-
scribe the types of trademark uses that are shielded from Lanham Act 
claims.82 Under the court’s standard, artists may use others’ trademarks 
in their works as long as the mark’s use has some artistic relevance to 
the underlying work and does not explicitly mislead consumers as to 
the source or content of the work.83 This reading of the Rogers test 
should be adopted by other courts because it grants artists great lati-
tude to express themselves artistically while also providing artists, 
                                                                                                                      
77 See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495; Byron, supra note 11, at 13. 
78 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495; Byron, supra note 11, at 12. 
79 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 492. 
80 Id. at 495. The court discussed the nature of parodies and noted that most consum-
ers would recognize that the defendant’s work was a parody that aimed to poke fun at 
Cliffs Notes study guides. Id. at 495–96. 
81 Id. at 495–97; see also Byron, supra note 11, at 13 (citing the factors that the Cliffs 
Notes court evaluated). With regard to potential customers of Cliffs Notes’s works, the 
court noted that Cliffs Notes books are not likely to be bought as an impulse purchase and 
that prospective Cliffs Notes buyers have a specific book in mind when purchasing a study 
guide. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 496. The court concluded that although some purchasers 
may mistakenly think the parody is a serious work produced by Cliffs Notes, this concern 
does not outweigh the public interest in protecting free expression. Id. 
82 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012). 
83 Id. 
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trademark holders, and the courts with a clear standard of which 
trademark uses are permitted and which are not.84 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s faithful application of the Rogers test in New 
Life Art grants artists great latitude to express themselves, thus further-
ing the First Amendment’s goal of protecting artistic expression.85 The 
standard applied in New Life Art accomplishes this by setting a low 
threshold for artists’ works to meet to be shielded from Lanham Act 
liability.86 As the New Life Art court and the Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
have demonstrated, the “artistically relevant” prong of the Rogers test is 
easily satisfied.87 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding indicates 
that, under the “explicitly misleading” prong, a trademark use is pro-
tected as long as the artist does not represent that the trademark hold-
er “sponsored” or “endorsed” the work or the use of the trademark.88 
 Moreover, the standard articulated in Rogers and applied in New 
Life Art provides artists, trademark holders, and ultimately the courts 
with greater clarity as to which types of trademark uses are permitted 
and which are not.89 When other courts, including the district court in 
                                                                                                                      
84 See infra notes 85–93 and accompanying text; see also Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethink-
ing the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1074, 1076–78 
(2009) (proposing, in an article published prior to New Life Art, a Lanham Act test which 
closely resembles the one used by the Eleventh Circuit, as it would provide greater predict-
ability and clarity as to what types of trademark uses are protected). 
85 See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1282; see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border 
Between the Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive 
Works, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 887, 893 (2005) (“In infringement claims, the parameters of 
trademark law and free expression are best assessed by the Rogers framework, which bal-
ances the public interest in protecting the use of trademarks as a source-identifier with the 
public interest in free speech.”). 
86 See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1278–79; Ramsey, supra note 31, at 906 (“Per the Ninth 
Circuit, this factor is satisfied as long as the work has more than ‘zero’ relevance, which is a 
very low standard.” (footnote omitted)). 
87 See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1278–79 (holding that the depictions of the university’s 
uniforms were artistically relevant because they were “needed for a realistic portrayal of 
famous scenes from Alabama football history”); ESS Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, 
Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an image of a strip club was artisti-
cally relevant to the creator’s goal of producing a “cartoon-style” version of a city); ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that an image of 
Tiger Woods was artistically relevant to a painting featuring golf tournament winners). 
88 See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1278–79 (holding that trademark use was not subject to 
Lanham Act scrutiny because its use was artistically relevant and did not explicitly mislead 
as to its source); see also ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 936–37 (same). The approach taken in 2003 
in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc. by the Sixth Circuit is also an artist-friendly standard 
because “it is hard to imagine many uses of third party trademarks within a work that 
would run afoul of the Rogers test as applied by ETW Corp.” Byron, supra note 11, at 11. 
89 See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1278–79; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 84, at 1077 (pro-
posing a test that is similar to the New Life Art standard that steers clear of the “morass” of a 
likelihood of confusion analysis). 
82 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54: E. Supp. 
New Life Art, have analyzed this type of case, they have engaged in a 
thorough and often time-consuming analysis of the work of art, the na-
ture of the trademark, and consumer perceptions regarding the 
trademark’s use in the work.90 Under New Life Art’s reading of the Rog-
ers test, artists and courts need not concern themselves with weighing 
interests or conducting a consumer confusion analysis to determine 
whether a particular trademark use is protected.91 As long as the two-
prong Rogers test is satisfied, the artist’s works are shielded from Lan-
ham Act claims.92 This standard should give artists the confidence to 
use others’ trademarks in their works without fear of liability while also 
allowing courts to dismiss these types of Lanham Act claims early in the 
litigation process without having to engage in a probing analysis of the 
artist’s use of the trademark.93 
Conclusion 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in New Life Art addressed the bal-
ance courts should strike when evaluating Lanham Act trademark 
claims involving works of artistic expression. Adopting the test articu-
lated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1989 in 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Lanham Act 
should apply to works of artistic expression only in situations in which 
the public interest in avoiding confusion outweighed the public interest 
in artistic expression. The court further concluded that the public in-
terest in avoiding confusion does not outweigh the public interest in 
artistic expression unless the artist’s use of another’s trademark is not 
artistically relevant to the underlying work or the artist explicitly mis-
leads as to the trademark holder’s sponsorship or endorsement of the 
mark’s use. 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is a victory for artists seeking to use 
others’ trademarks in their works. The standard applied by the court 
                                                                                                                      
90 See ESS Entm’t, 547 F.3d at 1100; Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g 
Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495–97 (2d Cir. 1989); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, 
Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249–50 (N.D. Ala. 2009); see also William McGeveran, The 
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2275 (2010) (arguing that although 
artists usually are victorious in Lanham Act suits, the process of defending these suits is 
“uncertain, lengthy, and expensive”). 
91 See New Life Art, 683 F.3d at 1278. 
92 See id. 
93 See Rosenblatt, supra note 84, at 1076–78; supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
Greater clarity as to the types of trademark uses that are permitted will reduce risk aversion 
on the part of artists. Rosenblatt, supra note 84, at 1076–78; see McGeveran, supra note 90, 
at 2276. 
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shields most trademark uses in works of artistic expression from Lan-
ham Act scrutiny and provides clarity to artists as to which types of 
trademark uses are protected and which types are not. Because it pro-
tects artists and provides artists, trademark holders, and courts with 
clarity, the standard articulated in Rogers, as applied by New Life Art, 
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